sexual classification, it may be even more important to queer development-where queerness emerges from the life-and-death struggle between self-recognition and its denial, between identity affiliation and its resistance. In schools, Hughes has long been proffered as a site of potential recognition for African Americans and, only recently and only in some places, gays; the problem of this recognition-that it contains, at the same time, the refusal to be recognized-makes that recognition more complete. Is there, then, a better home for Hughes and his closet than middle and high schools, where students can recognize not only queer desire but resistance to it? If one dreams, however, that this queer desire will emerge as a stable identity or with any clarity, this is a dream deferred. Readers of Hughes know already that this deferral is the appeal.
A PORTRAIT OF MR. L.H.
To begin with an analogy: the 1989 Isaac Julien film Looking for Langston is to Hughes's poetry what the 1889 Oscar Wilde essay
The Portrait of Mr. W. H. is to William Shakespeare's sonnets. Both works articulate a homoerotic desire about a past author that cannot fully be articulated, and, while ostensibly about a past literary figure, they are really self-explorations both for the characters within them and for Wilde and Julien themselves. We might even say of Shakespeare and Wilde what Henry Louis Gates, Jr. says of Hughes and Julien: "We look for Langston, but we discover Isaac" (1993, 232) . The works also problematize both sexual and cultural transmission. Shakespeare and Hughes remain unknown and unknowable; at the same time, transmission between those living in their respective legacies is linked to death. Transmission of the story of Willie Hughes is deadly; likewise, transmission in Looking for Langston can never be divorced from the transmission of HIV, as demonstrated in the refrain from Essex Hemphill's poetry: "This nut might kill us" (1989) .
Neither work wholly invents the desire it uncovers; that desire is already at least implicit (and perhaps already uncovered) in the poetry of Shakespeare and Hughes. It cannot, however, be proved. Wilde and Julien, though their works function as forms of proof, take homoerotic desire as both the point of departure and the point of arrival. In fact, the logic of the Hughes theory might stand for the logic of Hughes scholarship: "The one flaw in the theory is that it presupposes the existence of the person whose existence is the subject of dispute" (Wilde 1889, 82) . For, as Arnold Rampersad writes in his (L.) Hughes biography, "Hughes's reputation as a homosexual is based almost exclusively on rumor and suspicion" (1988, 337) . This was true in Hughes's own day as his (mostly gay) friends speculated about Hughes's sexuality.
1 It remains true today in the now classic sequence of an author's queer reception: (A) rumors in his life, hints in his work; (B) a biography that tries to set the record straight; (C) attacks on that biography as homophobically biased; (D) a public acknowledgement of everything but the proof; (E) finally, a moving on, both sides saying: there are better questions to ask.
2 For some, this means we can drop all discussion of whether he was or wasn't gay and dismiss the importance of queer content in reading Hughes. For others, this means taking Hughes's sexuality less as a thing to be uncovered or proved and more as a point of departure for exploring the ways his works enter into a dialogue with queer subjectivities.
One example of this approach, Shane Vogel's essay "Closing Time: Langston Hughes and the Queer Poetics of Harlem Nightlife," begins with the line, "Rumor has it Langston Hughes was gay," but argues that pursuing the truth of these rumors misses Hughes's "fundamental queerness" partly "because this unknowability was something that Hughes cultivated in his life and his literature" (2006, 99) . 3 Thus, what's truly queer in Hughes's writing is his and his personas' refusal to identify within a sexual category. David R. Jarraway aligns Hughes's queerness with his "dissident subjectivity," arguing that Hughes had too much interest in sexuality "to commit himself, either in his life or his work to one single category or label, identification or orientation, bearing or practice" (2003, 93) . Similarly, A.B. Christa Schwartz argues against "claiming Hughes's homosexuality," instead locating the queer content of Hughes's work precisely at the moments of ambiguity (2003, 71) . Juda Bennett locates the queer content of Hughes's autobiographies through the closet, but he too disavows making claims about Hughes's sexuality: "In searching to expose Hughes's closet, I do not, however, strive to impose an essential identity on Hughes as much as I hope to reveal a structure of thinking that informs his work" (2007, 70) . Lastly, Sam See, in writing about the queer implications of gender transversal in Hughes's poetry, does not want to "resolve such ambiguity [about Hughes's sexuality] but take it as a productive site of inquiry into how these texts represent the historical feeling of nonnormative, disidentificatory experience" (2009, 801) . If the most productive sites of investigation into Hughes's queerness are the sites where he most resists a fixed queer identity, the case of L. Hughes is the case of W. Hughes, where the refusal of definitive proof becomes itself the proof: "It is quite true that [Willie Hughes's] name does not occur in the list given in the first folio; but, as Cyril pointed out, that is rather a proof in favour of the existence of Willie Hughes than against it, if we remember his treacherous desertion of Shakespeare for a rival dramatist" (Wilde 1889, 82-83) .
If we begin with the question, Has there ever been a gay Langston Hughes? we can only answer: We don't know, but there has certainly been a closeted one. The closeting of Hughes by his estate in censoring and preventing the distribution of Looking for Langston 4 echoes the closeting within Rampersad's biography which in turn echoes the closeting within Hughes's own life. Any exploration of same-sex desire in Hughes's work is not that but an exploration of the closet that refuses to make that desire visible. Such exploration would reveal nothing about Hughes-because visibility would destroy the closet in question-but would contribute to an understanding of Hughes's appeal among critics and readers as a poet, as See suggests, on the down-low (2009, 801) . See uses the concept of the "down-low"-the phenomenon described frequently over the past two decades wherein men, originally and still predominately referring to men of color, have sex with other men yet, through a culture of secrecy, refuse the labels "gay," "homosexual," or "bisexual"-not to read homosexual desire within Hughes's poetry but, instead, to examine the relationship between Harlem drag-culture and two of Hughes's works. See argues that the Harlem drag balls described in the "Spectacles of Color" chapter of the autobiography The Big Sea (1940) as well as Hughes's Harlem poems in The Weary Blues (1926) "characteristically cross gender, sexual, racial, and even formal lines," allowing the balls, Hughes's prose, and his poetry all to work against the "pathologizing aims" of early-twentieth century sexologists. See, therefore, understands Hughes's work in parallel to the anti-identificatory impulses of today's down-low (2009, (799) (800) (801) (802) . While See focuses on the way that Hughes's work queers gender, this essay explores Hughes's poetic relation to same-sex desire, and, while See draws parallels between Hughes's anti-identificatory impulses to today's down-low culture, I argue that the down-low phenomenon might be the best framework in which to understand same-sex desire in Hughes's work.
See is not the first in putting Hughes on the down-low; John Edgar Tidwell makes this claim in "Sounds of Silence: Langston Hughes as a 'Down-Low ' Brother" (2007) . Where Tidwell argues for Hughes on the down-low in his biography, I add that Hughes's DL is as much in the work, his poetry, as in the life. Hughes's work is unique because unlike the other handful of nineteenth-and twentieth-century poets whose homosexuality is popularly accepted without a public self-acknowledgment (like Walt Whitman or Hart Crane) the critical understanding of Hughes's poetry circulates around ideas of resistance and refusal, meaning that his poetry enacts the very refusal that we could ascribe to his sexual identity. Like See, Tidwell views the down-low as denial, the "choice to keep his most intimate experiences shielded from friends and fans alike," the "decision to be self-protective," the "move to circle the wagons around his inner self for protection" (2007, (57) (58) (59) (60) (61) (62) (63) . I argue that the DL has an appeal, one that Hughes's poetry shares. Furthermore, when Tidwell writes, "This problem is clearly generational" (2007, 65) , he is implying that had Hughes been definitively gay (the final thrust of Tidwell's argument is that we cannot say this) and had he lived some decades later, he would certainly have been out. But the down-low is more of our time than of Hughes's. I am not suggesting that we, reaching backward, apply this concept to his life, but that Hughes's appeal as a down-low writer might resonate today for black students, queer students, and, perhaps most especially, "questioning" students. Sexuality and desire are a question that Hughes refuses to answer. Teachers should not try to answer it now because to leave the question unanswered opens the space for readers, like Hughes's child-like poetic personas, to be always questioning. With sexuality, questions begin early and always linger, making Hughes's questions a compelling model in middle schools, high schools, and universities for how to ask them without answering them.
ON THE DL
In the epilogue to Queering the Underworld (2007), a study of queer underworlds and the mainstream and middle-class culture that tries to infiltrate, understand, categorize, or destroy them, Scott Herring argues that there are two sides to every queer underworld: those making up the community and those directing intense scrutiny to define and expose it. Part of the scrutiny of the DL, what Herring calls "paranoia," is a throwback to the old days of AIDS paranoia when the lives of men-who-had-sex-with-men mattered only in that they might infect a straight female population.
But paranoia around HIV transmission is not enough to account for the "feverish pitch" of the "hysteria." Herring links it to "an ongoing crisis in sexual and racial definition; an ongoing crisis in how discourses police male (and unmentioned female) queers of color; an ongoing crisis in classifying and constructing the sexual activities that are thought to take place in what some have characterized as a late-modern sexual underworld-the fantasmic working-class ghetto" (2007, 198) . As evidence that this scrutiny focuses on the refusal of men on the DL to be categorized, Herring quotes an article in the New York Times Sunday Magazine:
How should guys on the DL be regarded? Whose responsibility are they? Are they gay, straight, or bisexual? If they are gay, why don't they just tough it up, come out and move to a big-city gay neighborhood like so many other gay men and lesbians? If they are straight, what are they doing having sex with guys in parks and bathhouses? If they are bisexual, why not just say that? (Quoted in Herring 2007, 201) He references, as well, Oprah Winfrey on her television show: "Do you then not consider yourself gay? . . . You don't? . . . Explain that to me, 'cause I can't figure that out. How is . . . I just want to know what it is" (quoted in Herring 2007, 205) . Herring ties the anti-label ideology of men on the DL to a resistance to discipline and social policing, arguing that "their queer slumming brings slumming narratives of sexual surveillance and compulsory homosexuality to a standstill" (203) .
There is more at work within the DL than a culture of classificatory social policing and a force in opposition to it. One answer to The New York Times' question of why men on the DL don't move to big cities and join gay communities is that they already have communities (within the DL-world or without) and a lifestyle that obviates one particular motivation, perhaps, by the definition of homosexuality, the primary motivation, for proximity to a gay community. Despite its late-twentieth century history, there is nothing necessarily communitarian about homosexuality; there is likewise nothing necessarily homosexual-or even queer-about resisting community. Still, one might wonder about the appeal of the DL, given that an open acceptance of one's homosexual or bisexual identity might provide freedom from the burden of secret-keeping; a group identity that, if not serving a psychological need for shared experience, could be organized into a political body; and, a protection from discrimination through legally defined minority status.
This line of questioning works, as Marlon Ross demonstrates in "Beyond the Closet as a Raceless Paradigm" (2005) , only by eliding racial or class difference. Coming out as a means to reassert privileges denied by homophobic structures requires that one's homosexuality, rather than race or economic status, is one's primary-if not only-site of disenfranchisement. Questions like, Why don't they just come out? presume a logic of progress to individual and group development that universalizes white middle-class experience as the only-and the correct-experience.
5 As Ross shows, there is more to this ideology than a lack of inclusiveness: "This narrative of progress carries the residue, and occasionally the outright intention, borne with evolutionary notions of the uneven development of the races from primitive darkness to civilized enlightenment" (163).
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One appeal of the DL, as C. Riley Snorton suggests, is a racialized resistance to white universality; the refusals of self-naming "gesture toward the seductiveness of down-low narratives to explain sexual desires without making recourse to a gay, bisexual, or queer identity, which is often racialized as white and gendered as feminine in popular discourse" (2014, 13) .
For Herring, the appeal of the DL, like the appeal of his entire project, is his interest in "those who disrupt slumming's conventions to thwart classificatory knowledge about the mysteries of homosexuality as an 'unveiled secret' " (2007, 14) . 7 Herring, reading "slumming literature" as "reverse discourses," cites Michel Foucault: "Homosexuality began to speak on its own behalf, to demand that its legitimacy or 'naturality' be acknowledged, often in the same vocabulary, using the same categories by which it was medically disqualified" (quoted in Herring 2007, 14-15) . Herring sees slumming literature as a reverse discourse in resistance to not just heteronormative classificatory discipline but also homosexuality's own reverse discourse of self-definition, resisting not only "compulsory heterosexuality" but also "compulsory homosexuality" (17). Considering that "compulsory homosexuality" has a color and a class, this resistance is to what Roderick Ferguson calls the "white homonormative" (2005, 53) . The DL refusal of self-naming becomes a reverse discourse to those that privilege heterosexuality, whiteness, or white homosexuality, but to describe this refusal as only resistance tells but half of Foucault's story. For Foucault goes on to dismiss the idea that a "reverse discourse" opposes power the way that a revolt might oppose the king: "There is not, on the one side, a discourse of power, and opposite it, another discourse that runs counter to it" (1990, 101). Foucault is suspicious of the efficacy of resistance alone 8 -resistance to power, resistance to classification, the forms of resistance that Herring celebrates-because: "Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power" (95). To think about resistances to sexual classification as powerful only as resistances opposing power is to miss the point: thwarting classification is an erotic alternative where the energies of desire are organized in ways that attempt to stand outside the binaries of sexual definition. In this way, the DL stands not so much in resistance to homo/heterosexual definition but as an alternative to it: an alternative that has an erotic appeal.
This particular alternative has all the tried and true elements for erotic interest. Who really wants state-sanctioned, parent-approved, scientifically classified, commercially endorsed, commonly enjoyed, personally understood sex? Refusing to name it is to return Allan Bloom's "little, domesticated cat" back into the "lion roaring behind the door of the closet" (1988, 99) . There is another element to this appeal, however, one specific to male homosexuality: a hostility to being feminized. Mixing identification and desire, one appeal of the DL is what Leo Bersani would call the "gay commitment to machismo." "The dead seriousness" of this commitment, Bersani argues in "Is the Rectum a Grave?," "means that gay men run the risk of idealizing and feeling inferior to certain representations of masculinity on the basis of which they are in fact judged and condemned" (1989, 208) . This commitment, as a gay parody of heterosexual masculinity, can be subversive but it is subversion motivated by its own internalized homophobia and misogyny. There's nothing subversive about homophobia and misogyny; moreover, with male homosexuality now less and less treated as gender inversion, new points of affiliation open between straight and gay males, seating the table of brotherhood with more gay males to the exclusion of stigmatized femininity. Homosexuality is no more immune, Bersani argues, to misogyny than heterosexuality, different in that it returns to stigmatize the male homosexual (as much as he might claim it as a thing he does and not a thing he is).
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To put Winfrey's questions about the DL another way: if you, a man, have sex with men, aren't you stigmatizing yourself to refuse affiliation with people like you? Yes, but the DL solves the problem of the classic joke: one gets to enjoy the club without having to be a member. This solution pivots, Bersani shows, on "a loving identification," where a gay male internalizes his own oppression by desiring heterosexual masculinity, an internalization that is more than sympathy for his oppressors, that "is in part constitutive of male homosexual desire, which like all sexual desire, combines and confuses impulses to appropriate and to identify with the object of desire" (2010, 209) . Desire motivates the DL's resistance to out-homosexuality, and, in a Foucauldian turn, that resistance lines up with the motivations for both homosexuality and homophobic masculinity. While it is unlikely, in the end, to pay out, the DL's refusal of a gay label is an attempt to double-down on the erotic while discarding the stigma.
Herring downplays the erotic appeal of the DL in his own work. In the manifesto that concludes Queer Underworlds, he advocates a new form of scholarship that explores subcultures without classifying, labeling, and defining, and instead he advocates for what Foucault calls "a stubborn will to nonknowledge." For this project, Herring asks "that scholars forgo their sexual curiosities" (2007, 210) , suggesting that a project without classification is also without eroticism, or that Herring's own project was without sexual curiosity. Foucault shows through the distinction of the ars erotica and the scientia sexualis that we can approach sexuality without classification. Such a project would have to name rather than disavow a libidinal interest in its topic. Given that this interest lines up with what Snorton sees as the focus on "the down low as an aesthetic and racialized mode of masculinity," this risks, at worst, fetishizing black masculinity, conforming to the white supremacist impulse to make visible, observe, and contain black sexuality. In Nobody is Supposed to Know: Black Sexuality and the Down Low (2014), Snorton argues, through the metaphor of the "glass closet" that this visibility and containment is the structure of black sexuality in America. Hughes's poetry is, however, one step ahead of this, one step ahead of the DL even, for it refuses this impulse as well.
Snorton explores the DL as "a set of mass-mediated narratives constructed by technologies of racialization, gendering, sexuality, and other forms of identification" (2014, 16) . Rather than focus on figures who might employ the DL as a means of resistance, Snorton resists the cultural narrative of the DL, which he argues restages "long-standing tropes about black sexual danger" (2014, 64) . That sexual danger, within a genealogy of white supremacist anxieties, takes on a particular power at our present moment of HIV history, and "re-presents-that is reframes and represents-black masculinity as dangerous, prone to trickery, promiscuous, and contaminated while also framing white masculinity and sexuality as less susceptible to such problems" (9). The object of Snorton's inquiry is the glass of the closet-the medium by which these narratives are constructed-but this glass closet does not preclude its inhabitants from acts of resistance: "Thus, while glass closets, stabilized by biopower and sutured together by institutional and social modes of regulation, may be a condition of black sexual representation, they are not spaces in which their inhabitants lack the capacity to act" (34). Hughes's poetry, read anachronistically within this glass closet, reveals a powerful capacity to act.
If one appeal of the DL-psychologically, politically, sexually-is the appeal of an eroticized closet, one appeal of Hughes's poetry-as well as his reception as a poet-is similarly the eroticized closet. It is not just that homoerotic desire permeates Hughes's poetry; that desire refuses to be fully disclosed, understood, or realized, and this refusal, like the refusal by those on the DL to "come out," increases its erotic appeal. I want to argue that we can neither understand the operations of the closet nor the queer erotics of Hughes without exploring the inherent eroticism of the closet created by the masculine refusal of classification, a knowingness of homosexuality without knowing, and a dream of initiation. These sites of understanding Hughes's closet are important not only in that they draw us in to Hughes but also in that each serves pedagogical and political functions.
"THE POETICS OF REFUSAL"
Regarding Hughes's relation to the public knowledge of his homosexual desire, his biographer Rampersad is unequivocal: "If Hughes indeed had homosexual lovers, what may be asserted incontrovertibly is that he did so with almost fanatical discretion. . . . He did not want to be considered gay. Whether this attitude derived from a personal aversion to homosexuality, or only from shame or fear, is impossible to say" (1988, (2012, 178) . The refusal of sexual identity is just one such refusal but it might stand for the rest in how his refusal becomes his appeal.
With the exception of the poems on sailors (Gregory Woods writes in A History of Gay Literature: The Male Tradition, "Hughes is particularly good on sailors" [1999, 210] ), Hughes's most erotically charged poems are heterosexual scenes. The perspective of these poems, especially the ones where love is frustrated or lost, is usually the female's: "When love is gone what / Can a young gal do?" ("Young Gal's Blues" 1927c, 123), "I cried on his shoulder but / He turned his back on me." ("Hard Daddy" 1927b, 124) , "He told me he loved me / But he must a been tellin' a lie" ("Mid-Winter Blues" 1926b, 65), "My true love's left me / And I'm goin' there to think about him." ("Lament over Love" 1926a, 70) , "The truth of the matter's / I ain't got no man." ("50-50" 1942a, 261) , "I broke my heart this mornin', / Ain't got no heart no more. / Next time a man comes near me / Gonna shut an' lock my door" ("Cora" 1927a, 119) . While Hughes might have in all matters of love taken Cora's advice, this cross-dressing allows him to play with the idea of males as the object of desire without getting himself caught. Of course, a female subjectivity does nothing to prove a male author's same-sex desire, but it is through this perspective that Hughes can explore masculinity as the object of desire. In desiring male bodies, Hughes always finds desiring male bodies, like in the poem "Trumpet Player":
The music From the trumpet at his lips Is honey Mixed with liquid fire. The rhythm From the trumpet at his lips Is ecstasy Distilled from old desireDesire That is longing for the moon Where the moonlight's but a spotlight In his eyes, Desire That is longing for the sea Where the sea's a bar-glass Sucker size. (Hughes 1947, 338-39) In locating within the trumpet player, an outward looking desire, Hughes can displace any desire for him through the alibi of "I do not love him; he loves someone else."
10 It would be like shooting fish in a barrel to demonstrate this principle throughout Hughes's poetry, and exploring methods of closeting is less my goal than exploring how that closeting might be, itself, erotic. What Hughes seems to like about guys is their masculinity (see "Trumpet Player" or the sailor poems like "Young Sailor" [1926d, 62] or "Port Town" [1926c, 97] ). A female persona prevents Hughes himself from being feminized in poems with a male object of desire. The refusal to disclose same-sex desire allows that desire, like in the case of the DL (and no less motivated by a hostility to being feminized), the erotics without the stigma.
Moreover, his refusal, or any refusal, to be defined by a sexual category conflates aspects of normative and queer identities, which, in itself, serves as a challenge to heteronormativity. In Homographesis, Lee Edelman explores homosexual difference through the logic of homographs, words that look identical but have different meanings. This difference in desire only serves, Edelman writes, "as a mode of strategic or analytic resistance to the logic of regulatory identity" (1994, 13) . This is also the logic of "passing," the phenomenon where a person of minority status assumes an identity conferring majority status. While passing always implies a potential vulnerability not disentangled from erotic investment (in that covering implies an uncovering, in that the additional garments of identity can be stripped), its motivation might be explicitly romantic. In Hughes's short story "Passing," the narrator is half-black but passing as white in order to get a good job and a girlfriend: "She's the kid I'm going to marry. Pretty good looking, isn't she? Nice disposition. . . . I wonder what she would have said if I'd told her I was colored, or half-colored-that my old man was white, but you [his mother] weren't. But I guess I won't go into that" (1934, 51) . It would be a mistake to conflate the two experiences, one of being secretly part black and living as white and the other of being secretly gay and living as straight, but Hughes's story does link the racial "outing" to "queer" experience when the narrator asks his family not to reveal his true identity: "Tell them not to queer me, Ma, if they should ever run into me and the girl friend any place" (52). Snorton shows what the DL adds to the frequent "coupling of black and queer" in literary criticism: "The down low's emergence in the twenty-first century reflects a set of logics that naturalize the equating of blackness with sexual duplicity even as it manufactures an increasing demand for materials that facilitate the disciplining and surveilling of black bodies" (2014, 3). His secret blackness forms the sexual duplicity of Hughes's narrator, all the while resisting the different sites-his boss, his family-of surveillance.
Racism and heterosexism rely on a logic where straight-whiteness is the base coat onto which difference-blackness, homosexualityis added. If the history of blackface shows how in the white imagination blackness can be put on, the more recent history, as D.A. Miller analyzes in "On the Universality of Brokeback Mountain" (2007) , of actors playing gay shows how in the straight imagination queerness is some external thing possessed by others that can similarly be put on. Passing, in either case, reverses this logic; in fact, the historical development might be reversed: minstrelsy and playing gay might both develop against the permeability of lines of difference. In their most offensive forms, aren't a white man's put-on "black voice" or put-on "gay voice" counterintuitive attempts to assert the absolute difference between his superiority and their inferiority? Passing narratives, where that direction is reversed, emphasize that permeability and undermine privileged whiteness and privileged straightness.
As Miller demonstrates in Brokeback Mountain, passing-in either direction-relies on nostalgia. For straights playing gay or whites playing black, the apparently collapsed difference is reaffirmed through nostalgia for the impermeability of identities. The parodies must be extreme (must long for a time when separation was more extreme) to disprove what the performance proves: the collapsibility of difference. But the reverse narrative, black passing as white, gay passing as straight, preserves this nostalgia through its longing for a stable identity that never was. If nostalgia is the feeling of gay desire passing as masculine camaraderie in Bear Pond (Miller 2007, 59) , it is also the feeling of Hughes's poem "Passing," where "the ones who've crossed the line / to live downtown / miss you, / Harlem" (1951c, 417). The Harlem they miss, a description of which begins the poem, at first unattached from their missing it, is a particularly nostalgic description of Dodger games on the radio, kids dressed too finely for their juvenile naughtiness, and a grandma unable to listen to her gospel hymns. The final lines, "Harlem of the bitter dream / since their dream has / come true," reveal an irony, as their dream has come true at the expense of the Harlem they miss. But their dream-to the extent that it was a dream for what Harlem ought to be, the images of the poem's opening-has indeed come true, in that only by having left Harlem of the bitter dream, can they see this invented Harlem of the poem's beginning. The poem depicts that looking-the desire for the past by those who've crossed the line.
Where is Hughes in "Passing"? Like in "Trumpet Player," he is looking at those who've crossed the lines, looking with desire at the past. The idealized Harlem of the beginning cannot be Hughes's position as he would not see it as aesthetized through nostalgia. Similarly, the aesthetic of "Trumpet Player" is nostalgia, the longing for lost love like that list of lost loves where Hughes plays the abandoned woman. There is both longing for the past and looking at that longing in nostalgia, a structure that masks the second. Hughes's inverted direction in the poem "Passing" calls attention to that mask. Unlike in the act of passing, "Passing" the poem requires a refusal to be located temporally present through nostalgia as well as a refusal to be located within the passing structure except at the line of difference. Hughes's refusals, then, invite the reader to the position where these lines cross, paring his position down to desire itself. This disrupts the closet logic of "in or out" but, seeing the closet door as a meeting place of queer and non-queer identities, destabilizes the closet itself. An eroticized closet refuses the idea that one must come out and replaces it with an invitation for the rest of the world to come in.
KNOWINGNESS WITHOUT KNOWING
There was a time when Alain Locke, the man considered to be at the philosophical center of the Harlem Renaissance, tried to seduce Langston Hughes. In a series of letters to Hughes, Locke begins with hints at his intentions then becomes more overt in his advances. We, of course, know that such advances will be refused, but Hughes plays along, asking Locke if he likes "[Whitman's] 'Song of the Open Road' and the poems in the Calamus section? I do, very much." To Locke's claim about friendship-the "cult I confess is my only religion and has been ever since my early infatuation with Greek ideals of life"-Hughes repeats Locke's phrase "the coils of classicism" and asks Locke to teach him the Classics (Rampersad 1986, 69) . Such language on both ends is part of what Linda Dowling calls a "homosexual code" in Hellenism and Homosexuality in Victorian Oxford (1997, xiii) . As a Rhodes Scholar only twelve years after the 1895 Oscar Wilde trial, Locke had an immediate connection to the "Oxford Hellenism" that Dowling argues employed and popularized this code. One might be skeptical that Hughes was in on the joke, but Rampersad, who throughout his biography systematically denies any proof of Hughes's homosexuality, insists on Hughes's understanding. He describes Hughes as "pretending not to understand what Locke meant by 'Greek ideals of life' and 'the coils of classicism ' " (1986, 68) . When Countee Cullen revealed what was at stake in Locke's correspondence, Rampersad writes, "Still Hughes appeared not to know exactly what was beneath the triangle of friendship. 'He was sympathetic,' Cullen wrote to Locke, 'but I do not believe that he fully understood the situation ' " (1986, 71) .
Throughout his poetry, Hughes exhibits what we might call knowingness without knowing about homosexuality. "Café: 3 A.M." is a rare poem in Hughes's oeuvre to name it directly:
Detectives from the vice squad with weary sadistic eyes spotting fairies.
Degenerates, some folks say.
But God, Nature, or somebody made them that way.
Police lady or Lesbian over there?
Where? (Hughes 1951a, 406) First, there is Hughes's own knowingness in setting this scene, in knowing what goes on at such suspicious places in the after-hours. But the closet is always a problematized form of knowing, in that the logic of "it takes one to know one" has an alibi when that knowledge takes the subjectivity of state surveillance. Because it is the state and not the poetic voice that is looking for fairies, Hughes's speaker manages to stand aloof, watching both the police and the degenerates. To use Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's terms, the poem gives us the spectacle but not the viewpoint of the closet (2008, . This problematized epistemology of the closet is itself depicted in the poem in that we cannot know whether the person being referred to is a police lady or a lesbian. But with that compulsive "Where?" we are compelled to find out, to know.
Whitman looms larger in Hughes's poetry than he does in the correspondence with Locke, but Whitman's relation to a homosexual tradition is as much disclosed and withheld. To take on Whitman's line, to insert into his line your own "I, Too," brings with it, to any writer in the twentieth century, the problem of Whitman's sexuality. This is no less known to Hughes, who selects the infamous Calamus poems particularly in his discussion with Locke. Yet, Hughes's reticence extends through his celebration of "Old Walt":
Old Walt Whitman Went finding and seeking, Finding less than sought Seeking more than found, Every detail minding Of the seeking or the finding.
Pleasured equally
In seeking as in finding, Each detail minding, Old Walt went seeking And finding. (Hughes 1954b, 446) In this poem we have a Whitman looking.
11 Looking for? Looking for pleasure or at least pleasured equally in the looking and the finding. Maybe he's just curious. We cannot know, but this unknowability is itself a part of the history of looking, as in the secrecy of nightlife that Daniel Tiffany connects to lyric obscurity, which he calls us to view "principally as an event or speech act: a remedial charm capable of affecting the reader or listener in various ways" (2009, 162) . Because it is a riddle, the poem seeks out the reader who is enough in the know to solve it, functioning not only as a description of looking but its own form of looking. Looking for the reader looking for Langston, the reader who can, by knowing, take pleasure in not knowing.
For there is pleasure in not knowing, as the poem "Maybe" makes clear:
I asked you, baby, If you understoodYou told me that you didn't, But you thought you would. (Hughes 1954a, 466) The relationship, erotic or loving, between the couple is located precisely at the site of unintelligibility. It is through the not-understanding that the addressee comes to understand, through the couple's inability to understand each other that they can connect. It is a relationship founded on ignorance. Citing Frederick Douglass's insistence on performed ignorance as a site of slave resistance, Snorton argues that "for the down-low figure, ignorance functions as one available tactic to negotiate the conditions of a glass closet." The deployment of ignorance responds to both white and straight hegemony: "the ontological and phenomenological facts of blackness . . . works in racial-sexual relations that allow ignorance to operate as a tactic of refusal" (Snorton 2014, 33) .
This gap between knowing and not knowing, which from one vantage point can be enjoyed, is also the crisis of queer development, which Kathryn Bond Stockton describes as the "backward birth" of the queer child, "a child remarkably, intensely unavailable to itself in the present tense. The protogay child has only appeared through an act of retrospection and after a death. . . . In one's teens or twenties, whenever (parental) plans for one's straight destination have died, the designation 'homosexual child,' or even 'gay kid,' may finally, retrospectively be applied" (2009, (5) (6) . Stockton points out that the increased visibility of queer people-on the subway, on TV, in church, in your own family-is changing the dynamic of this gap (49). This is the same argument for the increased visibility of queer people-and why it is a good thing when actors, artists, and athletes come out-but there is additionally a benefit when those people have (like you) resisted or continue to resist this definition. While increased visibility has made enormous gains in the legal status of queer people and their acceptability as adults in society, it has achieved far less, to date, in challenging the presumption of child heterosexuality. If a child, like everyone around him, presumes himself to be straight, the visibility of queer people gives him plenty of examples of people that he is not like, strengthening the case, in the ongoing battle for self-definition, that he is not that. Because most queer childhoods are marked by a resistance to queer definition, there is a need not just for figures who demonstrate self-acceptance but also for figures who demonstrate resistance. This is how Hughes or Whitman or Shakespeare serve anti-homophobic pedagogical projects: not because they were gay, but because about them we can say, "It is impossible to say whether Shakespeare was gay, but he certainly liked guys."
In fact, these three authors are particularly viable candidates for anti-homophobic pedagogy because of their centrality not just to the literary canon but to US public education. Students at nearly every school are made to read Hughes, though rarely in the context of same-sex desire. Even schools where administrators deny that their population includes gay students read Hughes. His closetedness actually allows his infiltration into the curriculum and thus, the proto-gay child's mind. Were he a "gay author" this infiltration would not be possible; were his poetry not to include a closeted eroticism of same-sex desire, it would have no effect on the proto-gay child's development.
Those trying to populate the world of LGBT role models with more gay black authors for the aspiring eyes of black students find Hughes resisting. Perhaps this is better. Such attempts often universalize white gay development as gay development, privileging those figures who conform-and, in doing so, pressure students to conform. Similarly, to treat Hughes as undeveloped, as not achieving maturity in his sexual identity, casts the same judgment on non-homonormative students as undeveloped-the kind of judgment that lines up with white supremacist narratives about black inferiority.
THE DREAM OF INITIATION, DEFERRED
Locke wasn't the first to pursue Hughes. Cullen made his own attempts only a few years before Locke. These too, it seems, failed, and Rampersad lays Hughes down on the analyst's couch to explain the reason:
With the New Year, 1923, came not so much another milestone but a challenge equal to any other he had met in the past two years, in the form of a campaign of homosexual seduction aimed directly at him. Psychologically, however, the contest was for Hughes's right to retain the privileged balance he had maintained up to this point between his childlike sense of wonder, on one hand, and his will toward adult effectiveness, on the other. . . . (Whether or not Hughes was a homosexual did not affect the nature of the challenge; a male lover would have posed the same threat to his desire to remain a child and to benefit from his innocence as a poet and in relationship to the race). (Ramersad 1986, 66) Rampersad makes a similar psychological claim about Hughes's later defense against Locke's advances: "Understanding what Locke was after, and its gravity as a challenge, in his own main defense Hughes had summoned up a show of childlike innocence so complete that even Cullen was convinced by it" (1986, 69) . Notwithstanding the irony of a psychoanalytical explanation for not acting on homosexual desire employing Sigmund Freud's framework for why one has homosexual desire-one wants to remain a child-Rampersad's point about Hughes's use of a child's perspective and presumed innocence is true, at least, in his poetry. While it serves, according to the biography, to resist homosexuality, it also, by being innocence, invites initiation and corruption.
Children are everywhere in Hughes's poetry-their perspective actually becomes more prevalent in his later work, suggesting that he imagined for his poetic self a backwards growth. Consider the age of the speaker in a poem Hughes wrote at seventeen who says, "I've known rivers ancient as the world and older than the flow of human blood veins" ("The Negro Speaks of Rivers" 1921, 23 ) with the diminishing age of the speaker in a poem Hughes published at forty-nine who says, "Consider me, / A colored boy, / Once sixteen, / Once five, once three, / Once nobody, / Now me" ("Consider Me" 1951b, 385) . Often Hughes's youthful persona is a feigned naïveté serving both the artistic goal of defamiliarization and its accompanying political critique of social structures. This reverses the racist trope of the black male (often adult) as the obedient child who says, "Okay," to the rebelling child who asks "Why?" This is the child of "Merry-Go-Round" who asks:
Where is the Jim Crow section On this merry-go-round, Mister, cause I want to ride? Down South where I come from White and colored Can't sit side by side. Down South on the train There's a Jim Crow car. On the bus we're put in the backBut there ain't no back To a merry-go-round! Where's the horse For a kid that's black? (Hughes 1942b, 240) The politicized child, one might say, is a queer thing. Here his political speech, a critique of the segregated car, is made possible by his ignorance of the politics of segregation. In Children's Literature of the Harlem Renaissance, Katharine Capshaw Smith shows that Hughes "turned to children's literature because of a passion for social change" made possible because "an embryonic younger generation" had "malleable" morals (2004, . Thus children are politically effective in that they are devoid of political ideology; their lack of political ideology makes them malleable so that they can be given an ideology with which to be politically effective.
This is the same circle of negation and the accompanying need to fill it that James Kincaid describes as the culture of "erotic innocence," where mass culture and child interact by "eroticizing a product [the child] that was marketed as eros-free" (2000, 55) . Culturally productive, the circle is, of course, self-defeating: for if the appeal of the child is its innocence, then that very appeal negates the innocence. To remain appealing the child must remain without a content, for the child with a content-be it ideology, sex, or genius, as in Hughes's poem "Genius Child"-is a dangerous thing that "Nobody loves." He becomes, instead, an unavailable paradox, whom we cannot know, cannot access, and about whom we say, "Kill him-and let his soul run wild!" (Hughes 1937, 198) . For Stockton, this child is necessarily a queer child, for the children "queered by innocence . . . all share estrangement from what they approach: the adulthood against which they must be defined" (2009, (30) (31) ). Hughes's child is queerer still in that he is the adult imagining himself as the child dreaming of adulthood, as Rampersad writes of Hughes's development:
Hughes would always be, to an extraordinary though not always clearly identifiable extent, a child. He would have a child's charm and glittering sense of wonder and innocence, a child's fondness for the dream, and an empathy for children that led to several books for them; but perhaps also, in an unusually protracted form, certain adult disabilities associated with childhood-sexual reticence, an anxiety to please, a constant need for approval and reinforcement. (Rampersad 1986, 35) Moreover, adulthood is deferred throughout Hughes's poetry, most famously in Montage of a Dream Deferred (1951) . If the appeal of the child in Hughes is the potential for initiation, it's a self-defeating appeal, but once he becomes an adult it is already too late for the dream has been deferred. In the poem "Same in Blues" from Montage, this dream and its deferment are explicitly sexual:
Daddy, daddy, daddy, All I want is you. You can have me, babybut my lovin' days is through.
[There's] A certain amount of impotence in a dream deferred. (Hughes 1951d, 427-28) Deferment makes Hughes and the characters that populate his poetry always a little late: late in the poem "Deferred" (also in Montage) to graduate high school, late to buy a stove, late to go to France, late to own a radio (Hughes 1951c, 413) . Belatedness in adulthood, like innocence in childhood, makes Hughes always unavailable in the moment; he's either the dreaming child or the dream-deferred adult. In short, Hughes's childishness may have been a defense against Locke and Cullen's "campaign of seduction," but his unavailability may have done more to redouble than neutralize their desire.
Locke and Cullen are not the only ones to find Hughes unavailable. Of canonical twentieth-century poets, Hughes might be the most accessible; at the same time, he remains unavailable. Kevin Young frames his essay on Hughes with this contradiction:
The challenge that Langston Hughes presents is not that his work is obscure, his life operatic or achievements invisible-rather Hughes as person and poet presents too much, is far too accessible. . . . Here, of course, lies the danger with Hughes, a writer who remains what I call "deceptively simple." . . . For all his clear language, precise diction, and even his famous folk character Jesse B. Semple, Hughes is anything but. (Young 2012, 169) His unavailability is the appeal, especially when thinking about the ways in which his text closets and discloses sexuality. In this way, Hughes resists even the metaphor of the glass closet. If, as Snorton argues, the DL is the structure by which black sexuality is on display, Hughes determines his own display, allowing some visibility but never containment. We readers who find ourselves looking for Langston are left with the pleasured rage of Alcibiades at Socrates's refusals:
What do you suppose my feelings, after this rejection, at the thought of my dishonour? And yet I could not help wondering at his natural temperance and self-restraint and manliness. . . . And therefore I could not be angry with him or renounce his company, any more than I could hope to win him. . . . So I was at my wit's end; no one was ever more hopelessly enslaved by another. (Plato 1999, 219c-219e) Look for Langston and you find him in 1960 introducing two "Blues dancers" at the Newport Jazz Festival. The act-two male dancers, Al Minns and Leon James, dancing the Lindy Hop together, as they used to do in the Savoy Ballroom of the 1920s famous for its "transvestite costume balls" (Rowden 2012, 427 )-warrants a preface from Hughes: "And this is the point I want to make just before these dancers come out. There are no girls with them. And for blues dancing, it doesn't have to be a boy and a girl, a girl and a boy." If you think you know where this history might be going, Hughes evades again: "You just dance by yourself oft' times" (Hughes 1960) .
It is not what we want Hughes to say. For many queer people today who see a personal and political project in naming stable identities in history and for themselves, Hughes's reticence remains a problem. Indeed, it lines up with homophobic silence, then and now. But the existence and persistence of structures like the DL should tell us that these are not only byproducts of that homophobia but represent a felt need on the part of many people to reorganize the way we think about sexuality, to challenge as well the racial obliviousness of essentialized homo-, hetero-, and bisexuality. The Black Renaissance of the 1920s is one place to seek methods for asking those questions, methods for rethinking sexual categories. While we might look back for Langston to just come out, we find instead challenges to that search and alternative modes of expressing desire.
NOTES
I would like to thank Stephen Burt, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., and Kevin Ohi for reading and commenting on this essay. 1 Cullen and Locke debated Hughes's sexuality in their letters (Rampersad 1986, 66-70 Smith 1983, 14) . Faith Berry's 1983 biography of Hughes describes some homosexual encounters and includes, as if to drop it coolly, a description of Hughes's friend, who "like himself, was a homosexual-a fact never publicly expressed" (1992, 150) . For B, Rampersad's biography is more nuanced on the subject than his critics give him credit. His answer is that there is no proof that Hughes was gay: "Twenty years after Hughes's death, although many people approached for information confirmed that he was thought to be gay, no one could recall any concrete evidence for his reputation. No one could offer the name of a man who had been involved with Hughes, or recall an incident, even at secondhand, involving Langston's presumed homosexuality" (1988, . For C, the accusations of that biography's homophobia, take Charles I. Nero's "Re/ Membering Langston: Homophobic Textuality and Arnold Rampersad's The Life of Langston Hughes": "Rampersad sets up a way to use evidence highly selectively and suspiciously by proposing a model he will use only when convenient" (1997, 189) . Or take Berry's response to Rampersad, titled "Breaking Silence," an Appendix to the 1992 edition of her 1983 biography: "It is not Hughes but Rampersad who appears to have the grand obsessions in the book, including repeated denials-in his narrative and acknowledgements to volume one-that Langston Hughes was homosexual. Apparently, he would prefer we believe that involvement in homosexual activity does not a homosexual make" (360). Or Alden Reimonenq's article on Hughes in The Gay and Lesbian Heritage: "For Rampersad and others who refuse to read between the lines in order to elucidate the facts of Hughes's life, it is clear that a political agenda is operative" (2002, 350) . For D, the public acknowledgement: Randall Kenan writes in Walking on Water: Black American Lives at the Turn of the Century: "It has become common knowledge that Langston Hughes had a penchant to fall in love with men-and was moved to write about it" (2000, 188) . 3 Vogel's other reason why a biographical pursuit will miss Hughes's queerness is the location of queer desire: "such debates locate the answer of sexuality and desire in the object choice of individuals, rather than posing the question of the constitution of the sexual subject in the first place" (2006, 399) . 4 For more on this controversy, see Vogel "Closing Time" (2006) and Hemphill "Undressing Icons" (2007) . 5 Ross also suggests that the logic of the closet does not necessarily apply to African American communities: "attention to African American history, literature, religion, and social experience indicates that intragender love has been constructed along axes not simply reducible to or easily characterized or explained by the closet paradigm and its attendant narrative of sexual evolution" (2005, . Given this, one might wonder why treatment of Hughes should involve a discussion of the closet at all? I do so because the closet door seems an apt metaphor for Hughes's concurrent closures and disclosures of sexuality. Furthermore, the history of Hughes's reception (perhaps biased by white-normative narratives) focuses on questions of his closet. 6 The "civilized" attitude toward sexuality has made its own progress. It used to be, to the liberal Westerner, that prohibitions against sodomy were the mark of civilization. Now, a liberal Westerner can judge as primitive those countries retaining anti-sodomy laws. This must be more than a little frustrating to a Ugandan or a Jamaican, for example, who finds himself accused of homophobia by those in a country that brought homophobia-or at least the criminalization of homosexuality-to his. That's not to excuse homophobic laws, just to note that in the Western trip from repression to liberation both ends have been celebrated as at least Western, if not white supremacy. 7 The phrase "unveiled secret" comes from Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit's Caravaggio's Secrets (1998). 8 Foucault clarifies that this does not mean that resistance is futile but that its complicated status with power means we must conceive of it as different from direct opposition: "Points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network. Hence there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. . . . This does not mean that they are only a reaction or rebound, forming with respect to basic domination an underside that is in the end always passive, doomed to perpetual defeat" (1990, 96) . 9 The history of US racism complicates black male homosexuality's relationship to masculinity by linking heterosexuality to anti-racist politics. The rules governing non-conforming black masculinity are often discussed in relation to James Baldwin and his fraught status as a black icon, such as in Henry Louis Gates, Jr., "The Welcome (1994) solves by algebra the heterosexual anti-racist function: "where it is 'given' that white racism equals castration and 'given' that homosexuality equals castration, then it is proper to conclude that white racism equals (or expresses through displacement) homosexuality and, by the same token, in a reversal of devastating import for lesbians and gay men of color, homosexuality equals white racism" (55). Marlon Rachquel Moore finds this problematized within Hughes's work, writing about his 1963 short story, "Blessed Assurances," in which the character John struggles to accept the sexuality of his son Delmar: "In this [black] 
